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Written evidence submitted by Dr Tat Yan Kong, Senior Lecturer in 
Politics, School of Oriental and African Studies  
SECURITY AND STABILITY OF THE KOREAN PENINSULA: THE NORTH 
KOREAN NUCLEAR ISSUE 
PART 1.  THE CURRENT CRISIS 
  1.1  Since 1992, North Korea has been under international pressure to relinquish its 
nuclear weapons programme and to allow international inspection of its facilities. The 
first crisis (1992-94) almost led to military conflict but was resolved by the Geneva 
Framework Agreement (GFA) of October 1994. The GFA unwound in late 2002 
when North Korean negotiators allegedly informed their US counterparts of the 
existence of another nuclear weapons programme. The US halted oil delivery supplies 
agreed under the GFA in December 2002. In response, North Korea declared that it 
was no longer obligated by the terms of the GFA, and took a series of actions to that 
effect in early 2003. These included: removal of IAEA (International Atomic Energy 
Authority) safety seals and inspectors; restarting its nuclear reactor and the 
reprocessing of spent fuel; announcing its intention to withdraw from the Non 
Proliferation Treaty; and declaring its right to produce and export weapons of mass 
destruction. 
  1.2  To bridge the gap between North Korea and the US, a series of Six Party Talks 
(SPT) have been held in Beijing since August 2003 (involving the US, North and 
South Korea, China, Russia and Japan). At the fourth round of talks in September 
2005, an agreed statement of principles was issued but implementation of the details 
and other disagreements led to another standoff between North Korea and the US. 
  1.3  The aim of this paper is to explain the nature of the problem, discuss possible 
solutions and illuminate North Korea's survival strategy in a post-communist world. 
This submission is a based on academic analyses and discussions rather than first 
hand observation of North Korea. As such, it should be read in conjunction with direct 
knowledge available from members of the diplomatic and business community based 
in the country.  
PART 2.  THE SCALE OF NORTH KOREA'S NUCLEAR WEAPONS PROGRAMME 
  Direct inspections, estimates and North Korea's own statements all point to the 
existence of a nuclear weapons programme. Only a weapons test can confirm the 
existence of weapons.  
  2.1  An IAEA inspection team which visited North Korea's small reactor (5 
megawatt) at Yongbyon in 1992 found a discrepancy between the declared amount of 
spent nuclear fuel and the estimated amount based on the capacity of the reactor and 
its length of service. The "missing" amount of spent fuel (plutonium) was believed to 
have been sufficient for the manufacture of 1-2 nuclear weapons. The declared 
amount (8,000 fuel rods) was stored and sealed by the IAEA in 1994 under the GFA. 
The IAEA seals and inspectors were removed by North Korea in January 2003 when 
the GFA broke down. If processed, North Korea could now have up to six nuclear 
weapons (on the estimation that it takes 8 kilogrammes of plutonium to make one 
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weapon). A high level US team from Los Alamos invited by the North Koreans in 
2004 mentioned that they observed processes consistent with weapons manufacture, 
but without measuring equipment, they were unable to verify. Two much larger 
reactors (of 50 and 200 megawatts) were started in 1984. If completed, they could 
yield enough plutonium for the production of 4-13 weapons per year. It is also 
possible that North Korea could also have obtained smuggled plutonium from Russia 
during the 1990s. 
  2.2  Apart from the plutonium-based programmes above, North Korea is suspected 
of having developed a programme based on Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU) located 
at another site. A US inspection team visited suspect areas in 1999 (in return for food 
aid) but found nothing. It was North Korea's alleged admission (that North Korea 
denies making) to the existence of this programme that finally derailed the GFA in 
October 2002. On the other hand, revelations from the Pakistani nuclear programme 
indicate that Pakistan exchanged HEU technology for North Korean missile 
technology. North Korea itself has talked about possessing a "nuclear deterrent" in 
August 2003, and from September 2004 onwards it started talking about "nuclear 
weapons". Finally, the production of nuclear weapons is within the capability of a 
country of North Korea's standard of scientific knowledge.  
  2.3  North Korea possesses various short and medium range missiles capable of 
striking South Korea and Japan. These include old Soviet Scud B/Cs (3-600 km), 
Nodong (1,300 km). In August 1998, it test-fired a long-range missile, the 
Taepodong-1 (2,500 km). Although the test was somewhat unsuccessful (the satellite 
failed to achieve orbit), the fact that it flew over Japan caused consternation there, and 
renewed US security concerns. In 1999, North Korea announced a moratorium on 
missile testing (see below). Although North Korea is still years away from developing 
an inter-continental ballistic missile (15,000 km), it possesses the capability to make 
further progress in this area. The export of missiles (mainly ageing Scuds) to the 
Middle East earns around $500 million per annum. 
  2.4  These estimates come with reservations. The subject is not one that is open to 
direct research, and for North Korea in particular, information sources are limited. 
Most of the information used by academics, policy think-tanks, and even the IAEA 
emanate from two sources, namely the US Central Intelligence Agency and South 
Korea's National Intelligence Service. In terms of total military capability, North 
Korea is minuscule compared with South Korea (its total GDP is only 3% of South 
Korea's). North Korea is militarily far inferior to South Korea, even without including 
the US. North Korea's 1961 defence treaties with the USSR/Russia and China have 
lapsed, whereas South Korea's treaty with the US remains active. 
PART 3.  FROM FIRST TO SECOND NUCLEAR CRISIS 1992 TO 2002 
  The current situation represents the latest of a series of crises linked to North Korea's 
emergence as a potential nuclear power in the early 1990s. 
  3.1  The first crisis arose from North Korea's refusal to permit thorough IAEA 
inspection of its nuclear facility at Yongbyon (60 miles north of Pyongyang) and 
withdrawal from the Non Proliferation Treaty (NPT) it had signed in 1985. Military 
conflict was narrowly averted by former US President Jimmy Carter's informal 
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diplomatic visit to Pyongyang in June 1994. Carter brokered a deal which eventually 
became the Geneva Framework Agreement of 17 October 1994. The central features 
of the GFA were: 
—  North Korea would allow inspectors to return and suspend operation of its 
5 mw reactor and reprocessing activities at Yongbyon. But special inspections 
would be postponed until the completion of two replacement light water 
reactors. 
—  North Korea would halt the construction (began 1984) of two larger 
reactors at Yongbyon (50 mw) and Taechon (200 mw). 
—  North Korea would receive two light water reactors (LWRs) (capable of 
generating 2,000 mw of electricity but less suitable for military use) to be built 
at Sinpo. The project would be financed by the Korean Peninsula Energy 
Development Corporation (KEDO), an international consortium consisting of 
the US, South Korea, Japan and the EU to the tune of US$4-5 billion (funded 
70% by South Korea). The consortium would compensate North Korea for lost 
transmission capacity with 500,000 metric tons of heavy oil a year (from the 
US) until the completion of the LWRs by the target date of 2003 (which in 
1997 was changed to 2007). 
—  North Korea and the US would open liaison offices in each other's capital 
as initial steps towards full normalisation. 
—  US economic sanctions towards would be selectively relaxed. 
—  North Korea would implement the December 1991 North-South 
Denuclearisation Accord with the South and resume inter-Korean dialogue. 
  3.2  The GFA left a number of loopholes. The plutonium North Korea was suspected 
to have removed from the Yongbyon reactor before the introduction of the IAEA 
seals in 1994 (sufficient for 1-2 nuclear weapons) was never accounted for. The two 
more powerful reactors under construction were frozen rather than dismantled. The 
GFA provided for the storage rather than removal of the 8,000 spent fuel rods. There 
was also suspicion that secret programmes existed at other sites. The cost of 
dismantling the 5 mw, 50 mw and 200 mw reactors was another consideration. The 
latter two would cost $500 million, the 5 mw one even more. Besides these technical 
problems, the principle of "special inspection" (ie intrusive inspection) was 
unacceptable to North Korea. North Korea interpreted the GFA narrowly as applying 
specifically to the programmes mentioned. The US view was that other programmes 
not specifically covered under the GFA would still be bound by IAEA principles 
(violation of which would invalidate the GFA). 
  3.3  North Korea's test firing of a ballistic missile in 1998 prompted US 
Congressional hearings into North Korea chaired by former Defence Secretary 
William Perry in 1999. The Perry Report of 1999 recommended a strategy 
"comprehensive engagement" whereby North Korean security threats would be 
eliminated through a series of reciprocal actions, Perry also provided for (but did not 
spell out the details of) the use of coercive sanctions if incentives failed. The first 
tangible effect was the Berlin Agreement of 1999, under which North Korea agreed to 
suspend ballistic missile testing (which was very costly anyway). It opened the way 
for reciprocal visits by Vice Marshal Cho Myong-Rok and Secretary of State 
Madeleine Albright in 2000. Coinciding with the heads of state summit between the 
two Koreas in June 2000, this represented the high point of the engagement strategy.  
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  3.4  Influential officials of the new Bush administration regarded the GFA and South 
Korean engagement diplomacy (Sunshine Policy) as rewards for North Korean 
blackmail. Others thought the GFA helped limit if not eliminate plutonium production. 
In June 2001, under the guidance of the Armitage Report, the US declared that it 
would continue to abide by the GFA as long as North Korea did the same. But the 
Armitage Report also called for a "broad agenda" of discussion to include improved 
implementation of GFA, tighter verification ("complete, verifiable and irreversible 
disarmament" or CVID) of North Korean missile development, and conventional 
military reductions. The US was vague about what North Korea would receive in 
return. North Korea viewed the Bush administration as demanding more without 
offering anything in return. On the other hand, the US viewed North Korea to be 
intrinsically untrustworthy owing to the nature of its regime, a view intensified after 
September 11, and reflected in President Bush's Axis of Evil speech of February 2002. 
PART 4.  SIGNIFICANCE OF THE NORTH KOREAN NUCLEAR PROGRAMME (NKNP) 
  The NKNP is a critical issue for the international politics of the region and beyond. 
  4.1  The NKNP tests the credibility of the 1968 NPT and its inspection regime. Thus 
far, three states have openly defied the NPT by "weaponisation" (India, Pakistan) or 
by not signing the agreement (Israel). North Korean nuclearisation would further 
weaken the NPT regime by sending out encouraging signals to other would-be 
violators. North Korea is a particularly important case given its geo-political position 
located between nuclear weapons powers (US, Russia, China) and advanced industrial 
powers with nuclear capabilities (Japan, South Korea, Taiwan). It could encourage 
new nuclear weapons states in a region with active historical and territorial disputes. 
  4.2  The danger of nuclear weapons also emanates from the nature of the possessor. 
North Korea represents an example of a crisis state, mired in a deep economic crisis 
and governed by a very harsh and distinctive communist autocracy. This link between 
domestic repression and international untrustworthiness is central to the thinking of 
the Bush administration. The North Korean regime is guided by a theory legitimising 
the use of military force. It has a proven record of using military provocations, 
terrorism, kidnapping and assassination in its conflict with South Korea. It also relies 
on smuggling, counterfeiting and arms transfers to unstable regions as sources of 
foreign exchange. The possession of nuclear weapons by such a lawless and desperate 
regime is viewed by the Bush administration as an unacceptable threat to the security 
of the region and beyond. 
  4.3  The fact that North Korea has not started any major conflict since the 1953 
Korean War armistice, however, indicates that the South Korean-US military alliance 
is an adequate deterrent to direct aggression. It is indicative that the leaders of North 
Korea are rationally calculating. Pessimists, however, argue that the possession of 
nuclear weapons will make it rationalfor North Korea to consider certain aggressive 
options: 
4.3.1    The diminishing prospects for the North Korean regime means that it 
may well be tempted to become more aggressive militarily because the status 
quo is highly unsatisfactory, with little hope of reversal (just as diminishing 
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horizons made Japan attack the US against the odds in 1941). This represents 
the "preventive war" scenario. 
4.3.2    North Korea could also use nuclear weapons as part of a strategy of 
"coercive bargaining". Instead of waging war, the North Korean regime 
provokes crises and incidents that antagonise the US and South Korea, but 
which they are unwilling to punish for fear of escalation into full-blown war. 
The result is that a new round of crisis resolution talks begins, enabling North 
Korea to gain new economic concessions. The launching of a medium range 
missile in 1998 can be interpreted in this light, as can the revelation of the 
HEU programme in 2002. 
PART 5.  SOLUTIONS 
  5.1  All the governments of the region support the denuclearisation of the Korean 
Peninsula but differ over the means. It is for the purpose of reaching a consensus on 
the means that four rounds of the Six Party Talks (involving North and South Korea, 
US, China, Russia and Japan) have been held in Beijing since August 2003. In spite of 
the difficulties (see below), multilateral engagement represents the surest diplomatic 
path to progress in the resolution of the North Korean nuclear issue. Peaceful 
resolution of the North Korean case also has relevance for strategies of coping with 
other potential nuclear states such as Iran. 
  5.2  Unilateralism does not work for either North Korea or the US, the two main 
protagonists in the crisis. North Korea cannot guarantee its own security unilaterally 
through developing nuclear weapons. The programme makes the possibility of some 
form of sanction more likely since the other five parties all oppose the nuclearisation 
of Korea. It also slows down the economic integration that North Korea desperately 
needs to arrest its economic decline. Unilateralism does not work for the US either 
given the impracticality of military or economic sanctions without multilateral support 
from North Korea's neighbours. North Korea thus poses a serious problem for the 
unilateralist Bush Doctrine (which asserts that it is both strategically and morally right 
for the US to take pre-emptive military actions against potentially threatening non-
liberal-democratic states). 
  5.3  Bilateral engagement will not work at the present time. The background of 
hostility and blame (who "cheated" on the GFA) makes direct, two party negotiations 
between North Korea and the US impossible (especially for the US). For North Korea, 
bilateral talks means superpower acceptance of their status, the very signal the US 
wants to avoid sending (to be seen rewarding cheating and brinkmanship). 
  5.4  Multilateral engagement in the form of the SPT represents the most practical 
diplomatic pathway to an eventual solution: 
—  It satisfies both liberal and hawkish strands of thinking in the US. For the 
liberals, it would be a chance to demonstrate their optimism that North Korea 
responds to incentives, that it can be steered towards denuclearisation and 
gradual reform. For hardliners, the North Korean regime is intrinsically 
aggressive but multilateral engagement will allow its true nature to be revealed. 
By exhausting the diplomatic channels first, such "hawk engagement" would 
enable the US to build a coalition for sanctions. In fact the twin track approach 
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of engagement first, but sanctions if engagement fails, is common to both the 
late Clinton and early Bush administrations (Perry Report 1999, Armitage 
Report 2001). 
—  Since it resents being "represented" by powers such as China or Russia, 
North Korea's preference is for bilateral talks with the US. A multilateral 
forum allows for such direct talks without being labelled as such given US 
sensitivities. 
—  The interests of the other regional stakeholders are represented. These 
stakeholders share a common interest in avoiding the two extremes of North 
Korean possession of nuclear weapons and US coercive action. Thus they 
exert a moderating influence. 
  5.5  At the fourth round of SPT talks, an agreed six-point declaration was announced 
(19 September 2005). The declaration consisted of the following main points: 
—  North Korea accepted the principle of verifiable denuclearisation. 
—  The US would refrain from attacking North Korea or reintroducing nuclear 
weapons to South Korea. 
—  North Korea affirmed that it has the right to use nuclear energy peacefully. 
—  North Korea and US and Japan should seek to normalise diplomatic 
relations. 
—  The five powers would provide energy assistance to North Korea; 
—  The international provision of a substitute LWR to North Korea would be 
the subject of further discussions. 
  5.6  Implementation of the agreed points would be based on the reciprocal principles 
of "commitment for commitment, action for action". The implementation of the 
declaration soon ran into problems. On the very next day, North Korea insisted upon 
the delivery of a LWR as the condition of any denuclearisation. Alleged North Korean 
money laundering activities also brought a tightening of US economic sanctions. 
Talks have not resumed as a result. 
PART 6.  UNDERLYING PROBLEMS 
  6.1  The current standoff reveals the presence of deep obstacles to the resolution of 
the North Korean nuclear issue. The core dilemma is whether North Korea trusts the 
US to allow its regime to survive after denuclearisation, and whether the US 
administration is prepared to recognise (thereby guarantee the survival of) a regime 
that it genuinely considers "evil" (and by extension, dangerous). 
  6.2  If it is to be consistent with the logic of "hawk engagement", the US should take 
the initiative of offering security and other incentives to test North Korea's sincerity. 
But the changed context after 9-11 makes this a difficult course. First, it portrays the 
US as weak and provides encouragement to other would-be nuclear proliferators. 
Second, opinion within the administration does not favour compromise with "evil".  
  6.3  The representation of North Korea as "evil" can be self-fulfilling. By treating 
North Korea in accordance with this image, the US administration fuels 
confrontational North Korean behaviour, which is then used to justify the initial 
representation. North Korea is also trapped in a mentality that fuels confrontation and 
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stalemate (believing that the US only responds to threats). Those who emphasise this 
dimension therefore attribute blame to both sides in the making of the crisis. 
  6.4  North Korea does not have the facilitating advantages enjoyed by Libya and 
Ukraine, both recent examples of successful denuclearisation. Libya demonstrates 
how an authoritarian family-dominated regime can give up its nuclear ambitions and 
improve relations with the US. Unlike North Korea, however, Libya possessed a 
nuclear programme rather than suspected nuclear weapons. Even though the US 
bombed Libya in 1986, there is no parallel with the history of mutual animosity and 
military build up (including US nuclear deployments in South Korea, 1957-91) 
characteristic of US-North Korean relations. The prospect of access to Libyan oil by 
US companies also facilitated reconciliation. Ukraine had hundreds of weapons, 
which it dismantled in return for a three-power security guarantee. Having 
experienced a transition from communism and embarked on the path of economic 
reform, weapon possession was not an instrument of regime survival for Ukraine as 
for North Korea. 
PART 7.  THE ROLE OF THE EU 
  The EU does not have geographical proximity to, or military presence on the Korean 
Peninsula. Neither does it have deep historical-cultural roots with Korea (as it does 
with say, Cuba). The EU's role in affecting the nuclear issue can only be indirect. 
Through diplomatic exchange, investment, humanitarian and development assistance, 
the EU can ease human suffering and help to reduce North Korea's diplomatic 
isolation. The EU's political and economic role in North Korea is useful (alleviating 
North Korea's plight) but not central like that of China or South Korea (ensuring 
survival). North Korea favours EU aid and investment but the EU is not central to 
resolving their dual dilemmas of insecurity and foreign exchange shortage. As such 
the EU does not possess any serious levers of influence with North Korea. Iraq has 
shown that the EU cannot restrain the US either. Since the onset of the current crisis, 
the EU has followed the US position (in calling for CVID etc). The EU is not in any 
position to participate in the SPT or other direct negotiations regarding the nuclear 
issue. North Korea (accurately) perceives the solution to its chronic security and 
economic problems to depend on recognition by the US. North Korea will look to the 
EU to diversify its future sources of foreign investment, but this will only be after the 
difficult task of reconciliation with the US has been accomplished. 
PART 8.  THE NORTH KOREAN REGIME AND ITS RESILIENCE 
  8.1  The features that make North Korea so anomalous to the outside observer 
(family-centred leadership, and centralisation of economics and power) are not so 
anomalous when viewed from a Korean historical perspective. Familial networks 
pervade in all walks of South Korean life as well. The monarchical status of the ruler 
and the dynastic transfer of power in North Korea are fully consistent with the pre-
communist forms of political authority (Japanese emperor system 1910-45, Korean 
dynasties before 1910). The centralised war economy emphasising heavy industry 
also characterised Japanese-ruled Korea. Thus many "Stalinist" features of North 
Korea owe their origin as much to the militarised Japanese empire (with which Kim 
Il-Song was highly familiar) as to Soviet or Chinese communism. From this historical 
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perspective, the populace is capable of enduring enormous privation in the face of 
perceived external threat. 
  8.2  The resilience of the regime is bolstered by other organisational and geo-
political factors: 
8.2.1    Famine from 1995 led to the collapse of the public food distribution 
system that had been a pillar of governmental control. In response to the 
emergency (including mass foraging for food), the authority and prestige of 
the military were enhanced. Since 1995, the regime's motto has been "songun 
chongchi" ("military-first politics") and the leader Kim Jong-Il is known 
formally by the title of Chairman of the National Defence Commission. So 
long as the military's standing is high and it remains adequately resourced, it 
can be counted on to defend the regime. Here, the North Korean leaders have 
learned from the contrasting experiences of China (loyal military) and Eastern 
Europe (indifferent military) in 1989. 
8.2.2    Since the defeat of the pro-Chinese and pro-Soviet factions in the mid-
1950s by Kim Il-Song's national communist faction, Juche (autonomy) has 
been the legitimising principle of the North Korean regime. Juche means the 
elimination of foreign influences from North Korea's domestic politics. 
Practically this means national sovereignty and the continuation of the rule of 
the Kim family. This ideology of resisting foreign encroachment and sacrifice 
for the leader has been deeply embedded in the psyche of military and the 
society at large for the past 50 years. The nuclear standoff with the US since 
2002 reinforces the sense of siege and national pride (at being able to defy the 
world's sole superpower). The famine and economic hardships of the 1990 are 
described in as an "arduous march" in pursuit of military objectives. 
8.2.3    Interests of North Korea's neighbours are best served by regime 
modification rather than regime change. Driven by concerns about refugees, 
civil war and even a general war, China and South Korea, have provided 
considerable amounts of aid since the start of the North Korean famine. Up to 
80% of North Korea's energy needs are supplied by China. This sensitivity 
helps to account for Chinese and South Korean reluctance to support US calls 
for punitive sanctions. Like the US, these neighbours also favour 
denuclearisation but not at the price of regime collapse. There are also other 
forces at work here. The Chinese government views the US as partially 
responsible for the crisis and finds US-led interventions threatening. 
Democratic South Korea has seen the rise of a new generation that is more 
critical of the US and less dedicated to reunification, a combination 
advantageous to a North Korean regime desperate just to survive. 
8.2.4    Economic liberalisation and political authoritarianism can be 
compatible. China and Vietnam shows how once tightly controlled communist 
regimes can soften their control over society without democratising. China 
also shows how an authoritarian regime may accommodate new social forces 
generated by market reform without the ruling party losing its leading role. 
Modernisation, nationalism and Asian values have become the new 
justifications for the regime. Since 1999, the North Korean economy has 
ceased to contract and cautious economic reforms have been implemented. 
These reforms are also accompanied by slogans about nationalism. The 
principle of "military-first politics" may well be used to justify very painful 
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reform measures once considered impossible under socialism (such as the 
shutdown of failing plants). North Korea has expressed admiration for the 
military dictatorships that transformed South Korea between 1961 and 1987. 
PART 9.  CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
  9.1  Initially developed to compensate for security fears raised by the first Gulf War 
and by the loss of the Soviet military guarantee, the North Korean regime has wielded 
the nuclear weapons programme as a bargaining counter that will only be relinquished 
in exchange for comprehensive guarantees of security and access to international 
economic opportunities. The nuclear weapons programme is the North Korean 
leadership's trump card in its quest for survival. It will not be given up lightly. 
  9.2  The best option for resolution lies in a negotiated deal consisting of reciprocal 
actions that achieve denuclearisation by assuaging North Korean security and 
economic concerns. It represents the superior option (in the sense of alleviating 
human misery, maximising economic development in North Korea, while 
contributing to arms control in the region) compared with the alternatives of coercive 
sanctions (military, economic) and deliberate neglect. Intrinsic resilience and Chinese 
aid means that the North Korean regime will not implode (as in Romania). If ignored, 
North Korea will continue to force the nuclear issue onto the international agenda. 
  9.3  The perpetuation of the North Korean regime in the exchange envisaged above 
presents dilemmas for western governments. 
—  Can North Korea be trusted? North Korea did not develop nuclear 
weapons during the era of Soviet military guarantee. Thus credible multilateral 
security guarantees can offset North Korea's need for nuclear weapons. 
—  Is guarantee of such a regime morally acceptable? A negotiated solution 
provides the best opportunity for lifting the North Korean population out of 
desperate poverty and for war avoidance. In the long term, trade, investment 
and cultural exchange will provide the conditions for the emergence of a more 
liberal society, even if this is not the intention of the regime. China, Vietnam 
and Cuba are indicative of how economic integration precipitates unintended 
change within deeply entrenched communist regimes. The dramatic transition 
in US-North Korean between the Carter and Albright visits (1994-2000) 
demonstrates the potential for reconciliation between the two adversaries. 
Note.  This evidence draws from many published sources. These have not been cited 
for reasons of space but can be made available on request. 
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